This acerbic gut response to such extreme relativism is what Paul Boghossian is banking on and playing off of in writing his new book Fear of Knowledge. Fear of Knowledge, Against Relativism and Constructivism – By Paul Boghossian . Article (PDF Available) in dialectica 63(3) · September with 1, Reads. Boghossian uses Fear of Knowledge to distinguish between true or false ideas and justified or unjustified beliefs. This book looks at constructivism and.

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Aug 22, Daniel Tovar rated it it was ok Recommends it for: In Hegelian fashion, Boghossian offers a putatively strong argument for epistemic relativism in chapter 5, a putatively strong argument against it in chapter 6, and a resolution of this ‘paradox’ in chapter 7. This entry has no external links. Callaway – – Dialectica 63 3: Cohen – – Informal Logic 27 2: We are inclined to believe something is true based on what people say. Goodman’s argument, Boghossian jnowledge, illicitly generalizes from the description-dependence of particular, genuinely description-dependent facts, e.

Epistemic Reasons and the Explanation of Belief Epilogue. Boghossian’s interpretation of the traditional argument as aiming at constructed facts rather bogohssian truths obscures this. While for some claims this might not be sustainable, Feat think for humanistic concerns, it is often moving target that needs to be constantly discussed and assessed.

A very enjoyable reading experience. More devastatingly, he argues that Goodman’s characterization of description-dependence requires that “some facts not be description-dependent. He offers a very strong case for thinking that Bellarmine’s system is not fundamentally different than ours after all, and that the Azande’s system is likewise not a genuine alternative.

This book is lucid and well argued.

Added to PP index Total downloads 12, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 23 19, of 2, How can I increase my downloads? Rather, propositions are only true because we construct them — and their truth. On both views, the relevant claim is true ‘absolutely’ on the one view, ‘relatively’ on the other because of a relevant fact that makes it so. No doubt truth can reasonably be seen in both lights; I do not suggest that Boghossian’s alignment is mistaken.


The constructivist can avoid the problem of conceptual competence. As earlier, I think Boghossian’s reply on behalf of the relativist does not succeed. Epistemic pluralism 73, italics in original.

That is, if our ordinary usage involves the concept of dinosaurs not having been socially constructed, then when one speaks ordinarily one imagines that a transporting has taken place to a world in which no one has devised the concept of a dinosaur, but yet speaks of such concepts. Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: Once the concept of dinosaur is in place, it applies to all members of its extension, past, present, or future members.

Fear Of Knowledge by Paul Boghossian | Issue 66 | Philosophy Now

Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: The relative neglect of that literature and the occasionally questionable treatment of it when addressed makes the book somewhat less helpful to specialists than it will be to those seeking an effective antidote to Rortian postmodernist relativism.

Boghossian says a social construction is something that is built. Sep 22, IWB rated it liked it Shelves: Doris – – Philosophical Studies 3: Boghossian further criticizes the Epistemic Pluralism clause of the Rorty-inspired version of epistemic relativism. It is also hard to explain why anyone should care about what follows from a set of propositions that are acknowledged to be uniformly false….

His common sense approach is accessible enough for researchers to question themselves and struggle with the pi I encourage any dissertation mentees to read this who plan to use social construction as a theoretical framework.


Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism

There are no absolute epistemic facts. With what right, then, could either party claim to have a superior conception of rational or justified belief?

Jun 29, Zack rated it liked it. If a belief is true, the corresponding fact of that belief holds for everyone. Refresh and try again.

Wittgenstein and the Boghossiaan of Our Believing. It is part of the concept of a mountain or dinosaur, he claims, that these things were not constructed.

Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism – Oxford Scholarship

All three are rejected. Equally frustrating are Boghossian’s concentration on Rorty, and moreover his attention to only a relatively narrow if admittedly central portion of Rorty’s work, ignoring other portions in which Rorty is careful to distance himself from certain forms of relativism. Radical contextualists in the philosophy of language adhere to some mildly concealed form of relativism about facts. While The Blank Slate is one of the most interesting books I have ever read this book will be forgotten by me in a months time I would dear recommend The Blank Slate over this book.

To summarize Boghossian, I don’t care if you want to make Hamlet a bi-univocal, ethno-hermeneutic discourse on Zuni nationalism, just stay the hell away from fewr philosophers and our respect for reality. The Social Construction of Knowledge 3. Oct 12, Melvin rated it liked it. He distinguishes fact-constructivism from another, weaker thesis with which it is, according to Boghossian, often boghossoan